We present a new denotational model for the untyped -calculus, using the techniques of game semantics. The strategies used are innocent in the sense of Hyland and Ong (Inform. and Comput., to appear) and Nickau (Hereditarily Sequential Functionals: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Sequentiality, Shaker-Verlag, 1996. Dissertation, Universit at Gesamthochschule Siegen, Shaker-Verlag, 1996), but the traditional distinction between "question" and "answer" moves is removed. We ÿrst construct models D and DREC as global sections of a re exive object in the categories A and AREC of arenas and innocent and recursive innocent strategies, respectively. We show that these are sensible Á-algebras but are neither extensional nor universal. We then introduce a new representation of innocent strategies in an economical form. We show a strong connexion between the economical form of the denotation of a term in the game models and a variable-free form of the Nakajima tree of the term. Using this we show that the deÿnable elements of DREC are precisely what we call e ectively almost-everywhere copycat (EAC) strategies. The category AEAC with these strategies as morphisms gives rise to a Á-model DEAC which we show has the same expressive power as D∞, i.e. the equational theory of DEAC is the maximal consistent sensible theory H * . We show that the model DEAC is sensible, order-extensional and universal (i.e. every strategy is the denotation of some -term). To our knowledge this is the ÿrst syntax-free model of the untyped -calculus with the universality property.
Introduction

Overview
In this paper we present a new denotational model for untyped -calculus, using the techniques of game semantics. A game model of the lazy -calculus was given by Abramsky and McCusker [2] using the history-free strategies of [1] . The particular variety of game used here is a fairly simple modiÿcation of that in [9] for a fully abstract model of PCF -the distinctions of "question" and "answer" are not needed.
In Section 2 we present some standard deÿnitions, rephrased to take this into account. To begin with, we deÿne an arena, which details what moves may be made in the game, and the notion of well-formed sequence, which (by restricting the possible traces of moves) sets out some ground rules. The games are played between two imaginary people called Opponent and Proponent who must alternate moves, and each move must be justiÿed by some preceding move. These ideas are familiar from the games literature, and the constructions of function and product arenas are standard.
During a game there is a notion of the view of the play up to that point, a subsequence of the moves played so far. This is the "computationally relevant" part, and we enforce a further rule on the game by the deÿnition of legal position, which says that moves may be justiÿed only by relevant preceding moves.
We assume that the players are operating according to some strategy, which we present initially as all possible traces of moves which that player will engage in. The deÿnition of strategies allows only for deterministic play. A condition on strategies called innocence means that a player may not take into account any irrelevant preceding moves. Furthermore, strategies may be "composed", if they are strategies for arenas of appropriate type. All of these deÿnitions are standard.
Another familiar idea is that of an innocent function, which is the presentation used in [17] . Instead of considering a strategy to be the set of all possible sequences of moves, we deÿne a function telling a player how to react in every possible situation. Innocent strategies work particularly simply in this form because we deÿne the function to map from views to (justiÿed) moves and no more conditions are required, and we show how one may transfer simply from innocent functions to strategies and vice versa.
In the same fashion as other games literature, we take arenas as objects and innocent strategies on function space arenas as morphisms to make a category -we call it A. As one would hope, this is a cartesian closed category.
In Section 3 we discover the ÿrst model for untyped -calculus, because there is an object U -in some sense the maximal countable arena -with the property that U = U ⇒ U (true equality, not just isomorphism). As is well known, such an object will give rise to a Á-algebra, which in this case we call D (or, if we restrict our attention to recursive strategies, D REC ). The elements of D are the innocent strategies on U , and composition of the elements is deÿned in terms of composition of strategies. We formulate a method of approximation: the approximants to a strategy are those which only play within a speciÿed ÿnite part of the arena U . We show that this satisÿes what Barendregt terms the "basic equations" for approximants, which lead in a totally standard way to the fact that the model is sensible, i.e. that all unsolvable terms have the same denotation.
However the model has some undesirable properties too. There are many undeÿnable elements (in particular, all the nontrivial ÿnite approximants to terms are undeÿnable) and the model is not extensional (that is, there are distinct elements of D which have the same applicative behaviour). The undeÿnable elements are really to blame for the lack of extensionality (and a related property, not having enough points).
In order to improve the model we seek in Section 4 a way to characterise the deÿnable elements. To do this we look at both strategies and terms in a di erent light. Strategies could be written in economical form, an encoding of the innocent function which deletes all redundant information. Terms are considered as Nakajima trees -this is the intuitive extension of a B ohm tree to an inÿnite Á-expansion. We can encode Nakajima trees in a variable-free form, a somewhat technical deÿnition but in essence just a way to write down an inÿnite tree (where each label is an inÿnite list of abstractions and a single head variable) as a function from sequence of natural numbers to pairs of integers. The major result of this section is what we call the Exact Correspondence Theorem: the denotation of a closed term, in economical form, coincides precisely with the labelling function for the variable-free form of its Nakajima tree.
In Section 5 we make use of this, using classical results which characterise those B ohm-like trees that are B ohm trees of terms, transforming these into Nakajima trees and then into the language of economical forms of innocent strategies. The result is a new class of innocent strategies, e ectively almost-everywhere copycat (EAC) strategies, which (almost by construction) are precisely the elements of D which are deÿnable. Since identity and projection strategies are easily seen to be EAC, it remains to show that arenas and EAC strategies, as a subcategory of A, still form a CCC which we call A EAC . This category still has the re exive object U so we can identify a new -algebra D EAC , which is both sensible and universal (every strategy is the denotation of a term). Consideration of the local structure shows that all three game models, namely D, D REC and D EAC , equate terms precisely when they are equated by Scott's D ∞ model. Thus the theory generated by denotational equality is H * , the maximal consistent sensible -theory. (A very similar result has also been obtained by Di Gianantonio, Franco and Honsell recently [7] . Using history-free strategies, in the sense of Abramsky, Jagadeesan and Malacaria, they have constructed game models of the untyped -calculus which all induce the same theory H * .) In contrast to D and D REC , D EAC is order-extensional (from which weak extensionality follows easily, and so it is a -model) and universal. To our knowledge, other than term models, the universality result is the ÿrst of its kind.
Finally, in Section 6 we outline some further work which allows the model to be reÿned, so that Á-conversion is not validated. Details of the construction, which yield a universal model whose equational theory is precisely that of B ohm-tree equality, will be presented in a sequel.
Prerequisites
We assume familiarity with the untyped -calculus for which the standard reference is [3] . Particularly vital topics include the notions of solvability and head normal forms, B ohm trees, standard theories and models.
Basic category theory, up to CCCs and adjunctions, is also assumed -see for example [14] . Some references are made to computability. A knowledge of the standard literature on Hyland=Ong=Nickau games [9, 17, 15] would motivate many of the deÿnitions, but is not required.
Notation
We describe some conventions:
• The set {1; 2; 3; : : :} is written N, and N 0 is N ∪ {0}.
• The set of all ÿnite sequences of elements from is written * . Sequences are written s 1 ; s 2 ; : : : ; s n .
• The empty sequence is denoted by .
• Sequences are usually writtens to distinguish sequences from elements. Sometimes we do not follow this convention.
• Concatenation of sequences is denoteds ·t. This notation is also overloaded so that, for example, m ·s means m ·s.
• The length of the sequences is written |s |.
• The usual order on sequences will be preÿx. The subsequence pre-order is written 4. • We will use f; g for composition in categories. The terminal object will be denoted 1.
• A -labelled tree is a (possibly inÿnitary) tree with nodes labelled with elements from .
• A partially -labelled tree is a tree with nodes labelled with elements from ∪ {⊥}, such that any node labelled ⊥ has no descendants. A node labelled ⊥ is considered to be part of the tree, but is without a label.
• A B ohm-like tree is, informally, a partially labelled tree with labels of the form x 1 : : : x n :y. A formal deÿnition can be found in [3, 10.1.12].
Game arenas and innocent strategies
We build on the dialogue games of Hyland and Ong [9] and Hanno Nickau [17] (christened H 2 O games by Girard, for Hyland, Hanno and Ong) using a variant in which there is no sense of question or answer. We present the details from scratch, and, although useful, no prior knowledge of the above references is required.
To begin with we describe what we mean by a "game", deÿning the notion of arena, which details the moves of the game, and legal position, which sets out some rules for the game. We introduce the notion of a strategy for the two participants of the game, and the property of strategies called innocence, and thus deÿne the categories A (and A REC ) of arenas and (recursive) innocent strategies, and show that they are cartesian closed. Both contain the same re exive object (for which the retraction morphisms are an isomorphism), leading to Á-algebras D and D REC . Some analysis of the models shows that they are both sensible.
Arenas, views and legal positions
The abstract idea of a "game" is based on an arbitrary set of moves. The game is "played" between two players called Proponent and Opponent, and the mathematical objects we study are the possible sequences of moves. The moves come in a structure called an arena, which speciÿes that certain moves may not be played until certain others have been (that is, may not appear in a sequence of moves unless certain others appear earlier in the sequence). The arena also speciÿes that each move may be made only by either Proponent or Opponent, and another rule imposed on the sequences of moves is that the two players must alternate, with Opponent playing ÿrst.
This idea is as standard in [9, 17, 15] , except that in these references each move is labelled as a question or an answer, and there are additional rules controlling the interplay of questions and answers. We think of our moves as "declarations", or answerless questions, and indeed the deÿnitions given here do correspond with the standard ones, with all moves considered to be questions. They are sometimes presented in a slightly di erent manner for clarity or because simpliÿcations can be made.
Deÿnition 1.
An arena is a ÿnite tuple of nonempty trees of moves. The root of each tree is called an initial move.
We emphasise that the moves are just an arbitrary set, which are given some extra structure to become an arena. Regardless of what the moves are, we will label them in a uniform way below, in a way which re ects their arrangement in the arena, and never refer to them except by label.
Remark 2. Our trees will be considered (and illustrated) "upside-down" with the root at the top, rather more like family trees than the botanical kind. Following this analogy, we can refer to a child of a node, and say that one node inherits from another, with the obvious meanings. Moreover, we assume that the children of a node come with an ordering and that this distinguishes them, thus we can unambiguously talk about "the second child of the root node". This means that we do not consider the trees to be the same, since in the ÿrst only the ÿrst child of the root has a child, and in the second only the second child of the root has a child.
The standard deÿnition of [9] is in terms of a forest (partial order with each upper set a ÿnite chain) and it is clear that our tree structure, ordered by inheritance and with the forests put together, determines such an order. However we wish to make sure that the trees making up the forest come in a speciÿed order. Further, we will only require ÿnitely many trees in each forest (which allows for a simple construction of products later on).
We will only be interested in countably branching, countably deep trees. Thus, we can encode each tree of the arena as a subset of N * by inductively labelling the root as and the nth child of the moves ass · n. Hence, each move of each tree is associated uniquely with a sequence of natural numbers. Conversely, given any subset A ⊆ N * which is preÿx-closed and has the property that whenevers · n ∈ A we haves · m ∈ A for each m6n, we can form an arena of one tree where the moves are the elements of A, with tree structure given by preÿx. If we represent trees by subsets of N * , we say that we are representing arenas in sequence-subset form. In this work, we will interchangeably talk about arenas in either forest-of-trees or sequence-subset form.
Each arena is of the form A 1 ; : : : ; A n , where each A i ⊆ N * . We say that an arena is single-tree if n = 1. Most of our intuition is based on single-tree arenas, and many deÿnitions are given only for this type of arena with the generalisation to multiple-tree arenas left to the reader. Example 3. There are three important arenas which will be referred to in this work: (1) E is the arena consisting of no trees at all; in sequence-subset form it is represented by . (2) M is the "minimal" single-tree arena, consisting of one tree of one node; in sequence-subset form it is represented by { } . (3) U is the "maximal" single-tree arena, consisting of one tree which is countably branching with every path countably deep; in sequence-subset form it is represented by N * .
We say that moves at an even depth of the trees (including the roots which are at depth 0) are O-moves, the moves made by the Opponent, and moves at an odd depth are P-moves, made by Proponent. O-moves are often denoted by • and P-moves by •. The polarity of a move refers to whether it is a P-or O-move, and we may talk about swapping the polarity of a set of moves.
We list some properties of, and a relation between, arenas for later use.
Deÿnition 4.
(1) A sub-arena of an arena A = A 1 ; : : : ; A n is an arena B = B 1 ; : : : ; B n (which therefore has the same number of trees as A) with each B i ⊆ A i .
(2) An arena is ÿnitely branching if every tree in it is ÿnitely branching. (3) An arena is recursive if, as a subset of N * , each tree in it is a recursive set (i.e. membership is decidable).
(4) An arena is recursively enumerable (or just r.e.) if, as a subset of N * , each tree in it is recursively enumerable (i.e. membership is semi-decidable).
Arenas can be formed from other arenas by two major constructions.
Deÿnition 5.
Suppose that A = A 1 ; : : : ; A m and B = B 1 ; : : : ; B n are arenas:
(1) The product arena A × B is the "disjoint union" of the trees of A and B, the concatenation of their tuples. Formally, A × B = A 1 ; : : : ; A m ; B 1 ; : : : ; B n . (2) The function space arena A ⇒ B is constructed as follows: the initial moves of A ⇒ B are those of B; to each tree below each such initial move, we graft onto it a copy of A. More precisely, A ⇒ B = C 1 ; : : : ; C n where
We illustrate the construction of a function space arena, when the arenas in question are not single-tree. Suppose that A = A 1 ; A 2 ; A 3 and B = B 1 ; B 2 . Then A ⇒ B could be pictured as
This picture shows how the arena A is duplicated in A ⇒ B, when B is not single-tree.
It also illustrates how we will draw arbitrary arenas -the triangle with a single symbol • or • at the top indicates some tree with the root a P-or O-move, respectively.
We note that any arena can be decomposed as the product of ÿnitely many singletree arenas. Moves of product and function arenas may be referred to as, for example, A-moves and B-moves, depending on which part of the composite arena they lie in. Notice that the polarity of A-moves has been swapped in A ⇒ B.
We have already seen that the way the moves are arranged in the trees of the arena determines whether each is played by Proponent or Opponent. The tree structure of the arena also determines which moves are prerequisite for each movethe idea is that a move may not be played until after its immediate ancestor in the arena has been played, and we might call a move's immediate ancestor its "enabling move". It is possible that there might be more than one instance of a move's enabling move, and for reasons which will be illustrated later it is important to identify one of them as the enabling move which was "used". For this we need the following deÿnition.
Deÿnition 6.
A justiÿed sequence of an arena A is a sequence of moves of which each element except the ÿrst is equipped with a pointer to some previous move. We call the pointer a justiÿcation pointer and if the move m − is pointed to by m we say that m − justiÿes m.
We say that a move m − in a justiÿed sequence hereditarily justiÿes m if one can reach m − from m by repeatedly following justiÿcation pointers.
Remark 7.
For the deÿnition it su ces to say that the justiÿcation pointers exist. To give this a proper mathematical meaning we can encode a justiÿed sequence as a sequences of pairs, the sequence of ÿrst components being the moves and the second components being natural numbers, such that if m is justiÿed by m − in a sequencẽ s · m − ·t · m ·ũ then the number paired with the move m is |t |=2. Note that since each move is justiÿed by a move made by the opposite player, and players alternate, the sequencet is forced to be of even length. By convention the initial move is paired with the number zero. (Here the sequencess andt are sequences of moves, each move of which are, sometimes confusingly, represented by sequences of natural numbers.) There are other possible encodings of justiÿcation pointers, but this particular encoding matches that used in the deÿnition of economical form in Section 4.1.
To avoid tedious detail, in practice we ignore this encoding, and typeset justiÿed sequences pictorially with lines linking each move to the one move which justiÿes it. An example of how this looks can be found in the next section. When we deÿne functions on well-formed sequences which involve manipulation of pointers we will not bother to explain the details of how the encodings are manipulated as a result, which in any case ought to be obvious.
We may now impose restrictions on the possible sequences of moves made in the game, as we indicated above.
Deÿnition 8.
A well-formed sequence over A is a justiÿed sequences which has the following properties:
Initial move: The ÿrst element ofs is an initial move of A, an O-move. Alternation: Thereafter elements ofs alternate between P-moves and O-moves. Justiÿcation: If m is justiÿed by m − then the move m is directly beneath m − in the tree of the arena.
Note that the last of these forces each move (except the ÿrst) to be justiÿed by a move of the opposite polarity. The deÿnitions for dialogue games involve an additional condition called well-bracketing. This is redundant for declaration-only arenas. Note that, as a consequence of the deÿnition of justiÿed sequence and the condition of justiÿcation, the ÿrst move may not be repeated in a well-formed sequence.
Well-formed sequences will be the permissible sequences of moves in the games played on the arena. One could think of these conditions as imposing some basic ground rules.
Remark 9.
Since Opponent can play any of the initial moves of A, and all subsequent moves are justiÿed (and hence cannot be roots of trees of A), Opponent has chosen which of the trees of A the rest of the sequence is to be played in. An idea presented in [17] is to label the roots of the tree A i in A as i , and then for any well-formed sequence we can see which tree it comes from by examining the subscript of the ÿrst move. In practice, we almost always examine single-tree arenas (decomposing multiple-tree arenas in the product of single-tree arenas if necessary) and so we shall need not use this convention.
Since initial moves cannot be justiÿed by any move, and only the ÿrst move of a justiÿed sequence is not justiÿed, it is possible to repeat the initial moves of A in the arena A ⇒ B but not in the arena A. This is a sort of "hidden !" of Linear Logic, which is made explicit in McCusker's presentation [15] . Our presentation is simpler but this also means that we must be aware of the possibility of moves becoming repeatable in function spaces.
In a well-formed sequence, some moves are considered "not relevant" to the player making the next move. We suppose that each time a player makes a move m he is really only interested in the next move (made by his opponent) which is justiÿed by m. Once such a move is made, he is supposed to ignore any intervening moves. This will be made precise in the deÿnition of innocence in the next section, but what follows is the deÿnition of the relevant moves of a sequence.
Deÿnition 10. The P-view of a justiÿed sequences, written s , is given recursively by = for initial moves
The O-view, s , is given analogously by = for initial moves [15] .
By a P-view of an arena A we mean a justiÿed sequence which is the P-view of some legal position of A.
There are other important properties of views, legal positions and function space arenas. Only the statements of the major results are given here, and proofs (in our setting when there is no sense of question or answer) carry over from those of the similar results described in [9, Section 4:4] or [15] .
Lemma 13 (View characterisation).
A justiÿed sequence of an arena A is the P-view of some legal position if and only if it is well-formed and every noninitial O-move is justiÿed by the immediately preceding P-move. The same statement is true with all polarities swapped.
Lemma 14 (View idempotency)
. Ifs is a legal position then s = s and s = s.
Deÿnition 15.
Ifs is a legal position of a function space arena A ⇒ B; with a an initial move of A occurring ins; we deÿne the following:
The B-component ofs, writtens B, is the projection ofs onto B, i.e. the subsequence formed by taking only the moves in B, together with their justiÿcation pointers.
The (A; a)-component ofs, writtens (A; a), is the projection ofs onto the moves of A which are hereditarily justiÿed by a, together with justiÿcation pointers.
In order to make the latter into a well-formed sequence we writes (A; a) + for b · (s (A; a)) where b is the initial B-move justifying a.
Note that we have to identify A-components by their initial move, due to the "hidden !".
Lemma 16 (Projection convention). (1)s B is a legal position in B.
(2)s (A; a) is a legal position in A.
Strategies and composition
Informally, a strategy is information which tells one of the players which move to make next, or not to make a next move, in any given situation. We deÿne a strategy as the set of all possible sequences of moves which the player is prepared to see played.
Deÿnition 17. A P-strategy for a single-tree arena A consists of a nonempty preÿx-closed subset of legal positions of A subject to:
Determinacy: Ifs · m ∈ ∧s · m ∈ for P-moves m and m thens · m =s · m , i.e. these moves and their justiÿcation pointers are the same.
Contingent completeness: Ifs
An O-strategy is deÿned analogously. However, we are more often interested in P-strategies which we will usually just refer to as strategies.
For a general arena A = A 1 ; : : : ; A n a P-strategy is an n-tuple of P-strategies, one for each tree (and we refer to these n P-strategies as the component strategies). However, an O-strategy is just a single O-strategy on one of the trees, together with information which selects that tree. This di erence is in view of Remark 9.
The property of determinacy means that, given any legal position after which it is Proponent's turn to play (i.e. the last move was made by Opponent), either Proponent may not make a reply or their move is uniquely determined. Contingent completeness means that all of Opponent's possible next moves are part of the strategy (although this is not to say that Proponent need reply to them).
Remark 18.
The standard deÿnitions of strategy [9, 17, 15] do not need to consider multiple-tree arenas as a special case, since usually the initial moves of the trees can be referred to under distinct names. A P-strategy is then just a preÿx-closed set of legal positions, subject to the rules above, which must also contain every initial move of the arena (and an O-strategy is the same except that it contains at most one initial move of the arena).
However, we prefer to keep to the terminology that an initial move is labelled , and add some special cases to the deÿnitions to cope with multiple-tree arenas.
Example 19.
The simplest strategy is deÿned by the set { }, i.e. the only legal position in it is . This is a strategy on any single-tree arena, and is denoted ⊥. We call this the undeÿned strategy or the empty strategy (even though it is not actually an empty set).
Deÿnition 20. We can deÿne the play of a P-strategy against an O-strategy to be the sequence of moves generated by them both. By the rules of contingent completeness and determinacy, ∩ contains one (ÿnite or inÿnite) chain of legal positions (ordered by preÿx as always). The join of this chain is the play.
If we have strategies and on arenas A ⇒ B and B ⇒ C, respectively, then we can form their composite strategy ; on A ⇒ C. Informally, we do this by identifying O=P-moves of the B component of A ⇒ B with P=O-moves of the B component of B ⇒ C, and then hiding all the moves in B. This is reminiscent of CSP's "parallel composition" and "hiding" operators. We describe this in formal detail only brie y, as details which carry directly to declaration games can be found in [9] . We ÿrst illustrate the ideas with an example.
Example 21. Suppose that we have strategies on A ⇒ B and on B ⇒ C, for singletree arenas A, B and C. We picture a possible computation of the ÿrst move of the composite strategy ; below.
This diagram illustrates the computation of the ÿrst P-move of the strategy ; . Suppose that the ÿrst move of the strategy in response to the initial O-move m 0 is the P-move m 1 , in the arena B ⇒ C. The way composition is computed, since the move m 1 occurs in the arena B it is duplicated as the O-move m 2 in the arena A ⇒ B, where it is the initial O-move seen by the strategy . We suppose that 's response to this initial move is the P-move m 3 , which is the B-component of the arena A ⇒ B. This move is duplicated as the O-move m 4 in the arena B ⇒ C. The strategy has now seen the sequence m 0 ; m 1 ; m 4 (each noninitial move was justiÿed by the immediately preceding move) and we suppose that its response is the P-move m 5 , in the B-component of the arena B ⇒ C. This is duplicated as an O-move in the arena A ⇒ B. The strategy has now seen the sequence m 2 ; m 3 ; m 6 (again each noninitial move was justiÿed by the immediately preceding move) and this time we suppose that its response is the P-move m 7 , which is in the A-component of the arena A ⇒ B. Since this move is not in the hidden arena B, it is the ÿrst visible move of the composition after the initial move m 0 . Thus we have calculated that the strategy ; , a strategy on the arena A ⇒ C, makes the move m 7 , the root of the C-component, in response to the initial move m 0 .
The formal deÿnitions are as follows.
Deÿnition 22. Suppose we are given two arenas A ⇒ B and B ⇒ C. We say thats is an interaction sequence of A, B and C and writes ∈ ias(A; B; C) if the following conditions hold: (1)s is made up of moves from the arenas A, B and C, and each move except the ÿrst is equipped with a justiÿcation pointer to some previous move; (2) Remark 24. For arenas with multiple trees, one must sometimes identify copies of the same arena in the composite strategy. For example, if we have strategies and on A ⇒ (B 1 × B 2 ) and (B 1 × B 2 ) ⇒ C, respectively, for single-tree arenas A, B and C, then the composition ; will look like and moves made in either copy of A will appear in the single copy of A in the composite strategy on A ⇒ C.
Innocent and recursive innocent strategies
As we commented in Section 2.1, we suppose that both players only notice the "relevant" previous moves when playing their next move. Exactly which moves were relevant to Proponent was made precise in the deÿnition of P-view, and we now enforce the property that Proponent's strategies may only take this relevant information into account.
Deÿnition 25. A P-strategy on a single-tree arena is innocent if for odd-length legal positionss andt and P-moves m,
i.e. P's next move, and its justiÿcation, at each stage depends only on the P-view up to that point.
A P-strategy on a multiple-tree arena is innocent if each of its components is innocent in the above sense.
For more motivation of why innocence is important see [9, Section 7:5] . Put brie y, innocent strategies have a certain amount of extensionality enforced on them. A key result, which is technically di cult to prove (for details see [9, Section 5.3] ) is that composition of innocent strategies is well deÿned:
is an innocent strategy on A ⇒ B and an innocent strategy on B ⇒ C then ; is an innocent strategy on A ⇒ C.
If we recall the deÿnition of a strategy, the property of determinacy means that strategies can be thought of as functions mapping legal positions ending in O-moves to Proponent's next move. The rule of contingent completeness then ÿlls in the rest of the detail, which is that positions ending in P-moves can be followed by any legal O-move.
Furthermore, the property of innocence means that the move, and its justiÿcation, made by Proponent depends only on the P-view of the legal position preceding it, so if a strategy is considered as a function its value depends only on the P-view of its argument. Recall that by a P-view of an arena A we mean a justiÿed sequence which is the P-view of some legal position of A; then an innocent strategy on A could be represented by a function mapping P-views of A to justiÿed P-moves, i.e. P-moves equipped with a justiÿcation pointer back into the argument of the function.
Deÿnition 27. For an innocent strategy on a single-tree arena we can deÿne the innocent function of , written f , which is a partial map from P-views which end in O-moves to justiÿed P-moves, by f(s) = m, with a pointer from m to the move m − ins, ifs · m ∈ and m is justiÿed by m − . We can deÿne the innocent function of an innocent strategy on a multiple-tree arena by forming a tuple of the innocent functions of the components of the strategy.
The reader will ÿnd it easy to verify that the empty strategy ⊥ is trivially innocent, and that its innocent function is the everywhere undeÿned function.
Remark 28. In order to make this a proper mathematical function we need to encode the pointer of a justiÿed P-move. We could follow the encoding in Remark 7, then the justiÿed P-move is a pair consisting of a P-move and a natural number which says how many pairs of moves one has to go back from the end of the argument of the innocent function. Indeed, the presentations given in [9, 17] used encodings of justiÿed P-moves from the start. However we prefer to avoid encoding the pointers when typesetting innocent functions, leaving encodings for Section 4.1.
A function constructed in this way is called innocent and we can formalise such functions.
Deÿnition 29. We say that f is an innocent function on a single-tree arena A if f maps P-views in A with P to move to justiÿed P-moves, and the following conditions hold: Obviously, an innocent function on a multiple-tree arena consists of a tuple of innocent functions, one for each tree in the arena.
We note that a function with such domain can only encode an innocent strategy. The conditions listed are required to make the function "strategic", i.e. the set of legal positions it describes are preÿx-closed, deterministic and made up of properly justiÿed sequences of moves. These conditions are su cient to allow us to construct a unique strategy from an innocent function as follows:
Deÿnition 30. Given an innocent function f on a single-tree arena A we can deÿne an innocent strategy f inductively by (1) ∈ f , where is the initial move of A.
(where the justiÿcation pointer from the move f(s) points to the move ins which projects to the move speciÿed by f in s).
Further, the construction of innocent strategy from innocent function and vice versa are mutually inverse:
In view of this very strong correspondence between innocent functions on A and innocent strategies on A, we use the representations of strategies as innocent functions and subsets of legal positions interchangeably. We draw attention to the di erence between "the innocent function" of an innocent strategy, and "an innocent function" on an arena. Each of the former must be one of the latter.
The representation as an innocent function allows us to deÿne the following properties of strategies cleanly.
Deÿnition 32. (1) An innocent strategy is said to be compact if the domain of deÿ-nition of its innocent function is ÿnite.
(2) We say that an innocent strategy is recursive if the innocent function representing it is (partial) recursive, after some encoding of P-views and justiÿed P-moves.
It does not make much sense to talk about a recursive function on a domain which is not at least r.e., and so we only consider recursive strategies on r.e. arenas. This also guarantees that as a set of legal positions a recursive innocent strategy is an r.e. set. Note that the innocent function representation of an innocent strategy can be found e ectively, and vice versa. Also it is clear that composition of strategies is given e ectively. Hence, Lemma 33. The composition of two recursive innocent strategies is itself recursive.
The technology of innocent functions, and the representation of justiÿcation pointers as numbers, allows us to deÿne strategies in an intuitive and typographically sensible way. (Note: This is not the only reason for their introduction!) We give an example of some innocent strategies to illustrate some of the recurring themes, to introduce our notation for innocent functions, and for use in the next section.
For any single-tree arena A we can deÿne the identity strategy on A ⇒ A, which can be pictured as below.
Both A 1 and A 2 are copies of the arena A. We write id A for the strategy which plays the P-move 1 in response to the initial move , and then in response to any O-move in the component A 1 (resp. A 2 ) it plays the identical move (which will be a P-move) in the component A 2 (resp. A 1 ). Formally, the innocent function of id A is for any sequence of numberss which is of appropriate parity of length (odd in the third clause, even in the fourth) and such that the moves 1as, 1asb, etc., do actually exist in the arena A ⇒ A.
We have omitted some justiÿcation pointers in the innocent function, but they can be reconstructed from the action of the function on shorter P-view, so this is unambiguous.
This is an example of a copycat strategy, in which P's response to any noninitial O's move is just to copy it into another tree. To generalise to multiple-tree arenas we ÿrst look at another example of a copycat strategy, which we will need in order to construct the categories we use.
For an arena A = A 1 ; : : : ; A n and for i = 1; : : : ; n we can deÿne the projection strategy on the single-tree arena A ⇒ A i (shown below), written The reader is invited to verify that identities and projections work as expected.
Categories of innocent strategies
In this section we show that arenas and innocent strategies form a category, which is cartesian closed. We also make the corresponding deÿnition when we restrict our attention to recursive innocent strategies. Proof. We deÿne products and exponentials as follows: (1) the terminal object 1 is the arena E (deÿned in Example 3, the arena consisting of no trees); (2) the product of A and B is the product arena A × B; We draw attention to the distinction between id A ⇒ B and eval A; B as morphisms. They are given by the same strategy, but have di erent domains and codomains and hence are di erent morphisms. It is clear that for any arena A the arena A ⇒ 1 is the empty arena E and hence that there is a unique morphism ! A : A ⇒ 1, the "empty" strategy ⊥ deÿned in Example 19. Note that 1 ⇒ A = A.
To show that A is cartesian we need that for arenas A, B, C and morphisms : A ⇒ B and : A ⇒ C we have a unique morphism ; such that ; ; B×C B = and ; ; B×C C = . Given the above conditions and the properties of the strategies we can easily show that the morphism ; : A → (B × C) = · works as required (recall that and will be tuples of strategies on single-tree arenas -the operation · is simply concatenation).
To show cartesian closure we need that for each f :
; eval B; C . Note that the arenas (A × B) ⇒ C and A ⇒ (B ⇒ C) are identical. Since eval B; C = id B ⇒ C , as strategies, it is easy to check that taking (f) as the same strategy as f is such a unique morphism.
Deÿnition 36. The Category of Arenas and Recursive Innocent Strategies, A REC , is the subcategory of A with objects restricted to r.e. arenas and morphisms restricted to recursive innocent strategies.
Lemma 33, and the trivial observation that identity and projection strategies are recursive, show that A REC is also a cartesian closed category with the same cartesian closed structure as A.
The Á-algebras D and D REC
In this section we use the fact that A and A REC are cartesian closed categories to construct the models D and D REC . We show that they are Á-algebras and that they are sensible (all unsolvable terms are equated).
-Algebras from A and A REC
The ÿrst model of the untyped -calculus was given by Scott in 1969 and a variety of other models followed in the 1970s. It was not until rather later that the general idea of what a model of the -calculus should be took shape.
We consider that a model of the -calculus must be a -algebra, a combinatory algebra which also satisÿes every equation provable in the -calculus (i.e. the formal theory ÿ). If in addition all equations provable in the Á-calculus (the formal theory ÿÁ) are satisÿed, we call it a Á-algebra. We describe a -algebra by a tuple A; •; <−= − where A is a combinatory algebra with application operation •, and for each valuation , <−= is a map from -terms to elements of A. For a precise deÿnition, the reader is referred to [3, Section 5.2] .
Scott showed how -algebras arise in cartesian closed categories, as follows. For any category we say that an object R is re exive if there are morphisms Fun : R → (R ⇒ R) and Gr : (R ⇒ R) → R satisfying Gr; Fun = id R⇒R . In this case we say that R ⇒ R is a retract of R, and that Fun and Gr are the retraction morphisms. A CCC C with re exive object R, together with the retraction morphisms Fun and Gr, deÿne a -algebra.
First, some notation: we write B n for the n-fold product ( In the last clause we may assume that x does not appear in (by renaming if necessary). (4) If is a valuation mapping variables to elements of A, and is as above, deÿne the morphism : 1 → R n by = (x 1 ); : : : ; (x n ) . Then set <s= = ; <s= :
The following result, along with a proof, can be found for example in [3, Section 5:5].
Proposition 37. With the above construction A; •; <−= − is a -algebra. We denote this model M(C; R; Fun; Gr). This is a Á-algebra if and only if the retraction morphisms are iso (i.e. Fun; Gr = id R ).
In fact, every -algebra can be obtained in this way, from some CCC with a re exive object.
Recall that the arena U , the "maximal" single-tree arena deÿned in Example 3, is given in sequence-subset form by N * . Observe that, as arenas, U = U ⇒ U , so that the strategy id U deÿnes both the morphisms Fun : U → (U ⇒ U ) and Gr : (U ⇒ U ) → U , and these morphisms satisfy Gr; Fun = id U ⇒U and Fun; Gr = id U . Also U is r.e., and Fun and Gr are recursive strategies, so U is a re exive object of both A and A REC , for which the retraction maps form an isomorphism.
Deÿnition 38. We write D for the Á-algebra M(A; U; Fun; Gr), and D REC for the Á-algebra M(A REC ; U; Fun; Gr).
The only di erence between D and D REC is the ambient categories from which they arose, and there is no di erence in the strategies used for identities, projections and retractions in those categories. Thus, the interpreting function <−= − is the same in both D and D REC , so we write <s= for the strategy which denotes the term s in either.
For future use we lift the notion of application in D and D REC directly to strategies on U :
Deÿnition 39. For innocent strategies and on U n ⇒ U (for any n ∈ N 0 ) we write • for ; Fun; ; eval U;U . Thus for terms s and t, not necessarily closed, <st= = <s= • <t= . Since some later results will require a fairly delicate analysis of application as strategies, we investigate what happens. Firstly, note that since the morphism Fun is given by the strategy id U it does not a ect the moves of the strategy . The arenas of the outer composition are shown below, with each subtree being a copy of the arena U :
The composition identiÿes moves made in the U arenas marked U 1 ; U 2 and U 3 and all are hidden, with the moves being made in U 4 visible. All the little trees labelled A -which represent the free variables in and , so we could call them context subtrees -are merged into one set of visible trees (as in Remark 24).
The strategy eval plays in response to the initial move, the root of U 4 , the ÿrst move the root of the tree U 2 . Thereafter moves played in the tree U 2 are copied across into U 4 and vice versa. Similarly, moves are copied between U 1 and U 3 . That is, the composition ÿrst plays across into the root node of the tree U 1 ⇒ U 2 , on which is played. Moves made by this strategy in the tree U 2 are visible, and moves made in the tree U 1 are copied across and played against by .
Thus the net e ect is that • is the strategy whose visible moves are those of in all except the leftmost noncontext subtree, in which moves are played and hidden with playing as the opponent.
Note that when there are no free variables, and hence no context subtrees, this is exactly the same as the strategy ; .
Properties of D and D REC
We now examine the properties of the -algebras we have deÿned. We are able to show that they are sensible (i.e. the equational theory induced by the models is a sensible -theory), but in other respects there are rather unsatisfactory.
A standard method to show that a model is sensible is to use an approximation on the elements of the model. The approximation we will use is based on the approximation of arenas which then induces an approximation on strategies. Here we are considering as an innocent function (and the justiÿcation pointers of the P-viewṽ and the move m do not make any di erence as to whether B :ṽ → m).
Note that B is still a strategy on the arena A, but is undeÿned at some P-views. An alternative deÿnition is to consider the strategies as subsets of legal positions, then B = ( ∩ {s |s is a legal position of B}) + , if S + means the closure of the set S of legal positions under the rule of contingent completeness.
The intuition behind this is that parts of the arena A other than B are "out of bounds" and B will neither play there nor respond to moves played there, but will otherwise behave as . With this deÿnition of "restriction" we introduce arenas which approximate the arena U , and an induced approximation on innocent strategies over U .
Deÿnition 43.
(1) U 0 = M; the "minimal" single-tree arena deÿned in Example 3.
(2) U n+1 = U n ⇒ U n : (3) If is an innocent strategy on U then n = Un :
This particular deÿnition of U n has the following key property:
Proof. As strategies we know that eval U;U and id U ⇒U are identical. Further, from Lemma 41 it is clear that for any sub-arena A of A we have id A A ⇒A = id A A⇒A . Hence taking A = U n ⇒ U n and A = (U ⇒ U ) = U we have that, as strategies
Thus n satisÿes these properties, which we need for an approximation:
Lemma 45. For ; : 1 → U in A (i.e. elements of the models D or D REC ); (i) = n∈! n ; [19] . The properties of the approximation are used to show that labelled reduction is monotone in the model, and hence that labelled ÿ-normal forms are maximal. This gives rise to an approximation theorem -in the model any term is the union of its approximate normal forms (introduced by Wadsworth [18] ). Finally, it is simple to show that the only approximate normal forms of unsolvable terms have denotation ⊥.
Proof. Conditions (i) -(iii
In addition to being sensible, there are other desirable properties of models which we might aim for: Deÿnition 47. Let M = A; •; <−= − be a -algebra: (1) M is a -model if it is weakly extensional, that is, (∀a ∈ A: <s= (x:=a) = <t= (x:=a) ) ⇒ < x:s= = < x:t= :
(The principle is that, after interpretation, (∀x:s = t) ⇒ x:s = x:t.) 1 (2) M is extensional if for all a and b in A,
(3) M is universal if every element of A is the denotation of some term, that is, ∀a ∈ A:∃s ∈ 0 : <s= = a:
Note that for any function on the elements of a -algebra, say f(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ), there is an element of the -algebra representing that function, in this case < x 1 : : : x n :f=. The principle of weak extensionality ensures that this element is unique. Furthermore, the -models have a pleasing categorical structure.
An extensional model has the property that every element is determined by its applicative behaviour -this is what one might expect in a "functional" setting. However, the -calculus itself does not have this property, since Iab = ab = 1ab for all terms a; b, but I = 1. However, if Á-conversion is included the calculus will have this property (for example I = 1 in the Á-calculus).
A universal model is a very powerful structure, as one can be sure of a 1-1 correspondence between the elements of the model and the equivalence classes of the terms of the -calculus modulo whatever theory the model imposes. In particular, one might hope to accomplish existence proofs for the -calculus by working on the model. A universal model could even be considered an alternative presentation of the -calculus, with respect to some -theory.
However, the models D and D REC do not enjoy any of these properties.
Theorem 48. D and D REC are not universal; not extensional and not even weakly extensional (thus they are not -models).
Proof. Recall that ⊥ is the "empty" innocent strategy with everywhere undeÿned innocent function. Deÿne the strategy ⊥ on the arena U by the following innocent function:
That is, ⊥ is the set { ;
We may consider ⊥ and ⊥ as deÿning morphisms 1 → U , and so as elements of the models D and D REC . Certainly we have ⊥ = ⊥ . However, the fact that neither ⊥ nor ⊥ ever moves outside the ÿrst subtree means that they cannot make moves that are visible in the composition which arises in application. Hence for all strategies : 1 → U ,
⊥ • = ⊥ • = ⊥:
Hence D and D REC are not extensional. Now it is a standard result that any -algebra is extensional if and only if it is weakly extensional and a Á-algebra. For a proof see, for example, [3, Section 5.2]. Since D and D REC are Á-algebras but are not extensional, they cannot be weakly extensional either.
We show that ⊥ is not the denotation of any term as follows: Suppose there is a term s such that <s= = ⊥ . We have shown that <s= • = ⊥ for all strategies : 1 → U , so <st= = ⊥ for all terms t. Hence st is unsolvable for all t, so s is unsolvable and hence <s= = ⊥.
Finding an improved version of these models is the subject of the next sections.
Economical form and exact correspondence
Our aim in this section is to gain more information on the strategies which denote terms of the -calculus in the models D and D REC .
To do so we ÿrst present an economical way to encode strategies. We then recall the deÿnition of the Nakajima tree of a term, an inÿnitary syntax tree deriving from the B ohm tree after inÿnite Á-expansion. We give a representation of Nakajima trees which is variable-free (i.e. all bound variables are replaced by syntax-free encoded "pointers", which can be seen as two-dimensional de Bruijn indices). The powerful result linking strategies and Nakajima trees, which we call an Exact Correspondence Theorem, is that the denotation of a term, in the new economical representation, is precisely the same as the labelling function of the variable-free Nakajima tree of that term. This allows us to examine the local structure of the models D and D REC in more detail than we were able to in the previous section, and show that they induce the equational theory H * .
Innocent strategies in economical form
Recall the representation of innocent strategies as innocent functions, mapping P-views to justiÿed P-moves. We may encode any arena as a subset of N * , so that a P-view is a ( justiÿed) sequence of elements of N * , and also encode the justiÿca-tion pointer as a member of N 0 by counting the number of pairs of moves it points backwards over, as in Remarks 7 and 28.
There are three properties which allow for a more compact representation of an innocent strategy: (1) We know that the domain of an innocent function is made up of P-views.
Lemma 13 shows that each noninitial O-move in any P-view must be a child of the previous move, and the initial move must be . (2) The conditions on an innocent function mean that, for a P-view which is in the domain of the function, given only the O-moves in this P-view and the value of the innocent function on strictly shorter P-views we can reconstruct the P-view entirely. (3) The condition of Justiÿcation on well-formed sequences means that the P-move to which this P-view is mapped must be a child of the move which it is justiÿed by. In view of these redundancies, we encode innocent strategies over any single-tree arena as (partial) maps from N * to N × N 0 . We call this encoding the economical form of and sometimes write it e (but usually we abuse notation and write it f too). It is deÿned as follows:
(We set p = n when the resulting move in the clause of f is a child of the initial move, intending "s 0 v 0 " to mean the sequence .)
Justiÿcation pointers in the P-view can be deduced from the behaviour of f on shorter P-views, and so have been omitted. The sequencess i are sequences of natural numbers encoding moves in the way we use for sequence-subset form of arenas. By the move "s i v i " we mean the move which encoded by the sequences i · v i , which by deÿnition is the v i th child of the move coded bys i .
Furthermore, we can expand any partial function f : N * * N×N 0 which has preÿx-closed domain and satisÿes f(ṽ) = (i; p) ⇒ 06p6|ṽ | into an innocent strategy on U . Depending on the function, we might not need the whole of U to contain the strategy.
A strategy on a multiple-tree arena will be encoded as a tuple of such functions, one for each component. In practice, we will only be interested in using this encoding for the arena U .
Example 49.
Recall that the following is the innocent function of the copycat strategy id U :
Heres range over sequences of appropriate parity, a and b over positive natural numbers. The reader is invited to check that the economical form of this strategy is given by → (1; 0); i → (i + 1; 1) and for nonempty sequencesṽ;ṽi → (i; 1).
Nakajima trees and variable-free form
The following presentation of terms as trees was ÿrst proposed by Nakajima [16] . The principle that a term of the untyped -calculus may be applied to any number of other terms suggests that, for example, the term I = x :x might be better expanded inÿnitely many times by the rule Á, and represented by the pseudo-syntax xz 0 z 1 z 2 : : :•xz 0 z 1 z 2 : : :. The large dot • is used to make clear the "end" of the inÿnite chain of abstractions and the start of the inÿnite chain of applications in the term. Combining this idea into a presentation of terms in the style of B ohm trees leads to the following deÿnition.
Deÿnition 50. Let be the set { x 1 x 2 : : : • y | x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; y variables}.
For a -term s the Nakajima tree of s, written NT(s), is the countably branching, countably deep partially -labelled tree deÿned inductively as follows.
A formalization of the process of ÿnding fresh variables at each stage is given in [16] .
In order to work modulo -conversion, we would like to follow de Bruijn (as in [6] ) and construct a variable-free representation of Nakajima trees. We know that each node which has a label has one of the form x 1 x 2 : : : • y and always has countably many children, so all we need to encode are the head variables at each node. Assuming that the term whose Nakajima tree we are encoding is closed, each head variable is an instance of an abstraction from one of its ancestors in the tree. We thus encode each labelled node's head variable as a pair, the second component of which counts how many levels up the tree we go to ÿnd the abstraction which introduced this head variable, and the ÿrst component counts how far along the inÿnite chain of abstractions this variable appears.
Example 51. We illustrate with an example. The term x : x ( y:yx) has Nakajima tree of which the following is a part (some subtrees are missing):
The node labelled : : : • z 1 should be encoded as the pair (2; 1) corresponding to the fact that we go up one level of the tree and take the second abstracted variable to get z 1 . Similarly, the node in the lowest pictured level labelled : : : • x should be encoded (1; 2).
A precise deÿnition of this encoding is tricky, because we have to deal with free variables, of which there are countably many in Nakajima trees. The following deÿni-tion is quite technical, and we have to do a bit of work to show that this deÿnition matches up with the informal notion just described, but this form is useful for the characterisation proof which follows. Similarly the tree {p} n , for n ∈ N 0 , is labelled identically except for nodes of depth d as follows: (1) We note here that for any tree p; {p} 0 = p and {{p} m } n = {p} m+n .
Lemma 53. This deÿnition coincides with the informal notion of variable-free form described earlier. Formally; suppose that s is a term with free variables within all occurring in the sequence = v k ; : : : ; v 1 . Construct the Nakajima tree of s; and rename all the bound variables so that ifã ∈ N * is the sequence identifying a node of the Nakajima tree then the abstracted variables at that node are renamed to x˜a 1 ; x˜a 2 ; : : : (in that order). Let this renamed Nakajima tree have labelling function A; and consider VFF (s) also as a labelling function. Then for any sequenceã = a 1 ; : : : ; a p there are three possibilities for A(ã) : In each case the result holds.
Inductive step: We assume that the result holds for all terms s, sequences which contain all the free variables of s, and sequencesã of length up to and including l.
Take a particular term s and sequence = v k ; : : : ; v 1 containing all the free variables of s. If s is unsolvable then the result is trivial as in (i) above. Otherwise, suppose that s has HNF x 1 : : : x n :ys 1 : : : s m for some variable y (which as above will be either x j or v j , it will make no di erence which). Take any sequenceã = a 1 ; : : : ; a p for p6l, and any i ∈ N 0 . We show that the result holds for the sequence i ·ã (and we already know it holds for the sequence ) which will establish the inductive step as required.
Suppose that we take the Nakajima tree of the term s i , and renamed bound variables so that the ith abstracted variable at the node encoded byṽ is renamed to y˜v i . Let the labelling function of this tree be B. We know that the free variables of this tree are contained within , and we will be applying the induction hypothesis to B. The deÿnition of Nakajima tree describes how the labels of B are related to those of A.
There are six cases: (1) i6m and i ·ã = ∈ dom(A). Thenã = ∈ dom(B), so by the induction hypothesis VFF (s i ) is unlabelled or undeÿned atã, and hence VFF (s) is unlabelled or undeÿned at i ·ã. We see that the result holds in each case.
Remark 54. The construction of VFF(s) from s, and that of NT(s) from s, is not a computable procedure in the same way the ÿrst deÿnition of B ohm tree in [3, Section 10:1], is not. However Lemma 53 does give a recursive translation of Nakajima trees into variable-free form, and the latter can be presented e ectively (as they are in [16] ).
The connection between NT(s) and VFF(s), described formally in Lemma 53, is now illustrated. Take the term s = x:x ( y:yx), the Nakajima tree of which is given above in Example 51. Applying the rules for constructing the variable-free form gives a tree of which part is:
The reader is invited to compare this with the Nakajima tree, and check what Lemma 53 means at each pictured node.
Exact correspondence and local structure
The representation of an innocent strategy described in Section 4.1, and that of Nakajima tree in Section 4.2 are now pulled together. In the models D and D REC the denotation of a term, in economical form, coincides with the labelling function of the variable-free form of its Nakajima tree.
Theorem 55 (Exact correspondence theorem). If s ∈ with free variables in = v k ; : : : ; v 1 then <s= = {VFF (s)} k when the former is considered in economical form and the latter as a labelling function.
In particular for closed terms s; <s= = VFF (s).
Proof. The proof is long-winded and the interested reader is referred to Appendix A.
Example 56. Referring back to the example of the last section, this means that the economical form of the strategy < x:x ( y:yx)= is partially given by
The exact correspondence result gives us the local order structure of the models D and D REC immediately.
Corollary 57. In the models D and D REC ; for closed terms s and t:
The order ⊆ on the model is inclusion of strategies. That on Nakajima trees is inclusion of labelling function; modulo renaming of bound variables; with amounts to inclusion of variable-free form. The order 6 on D ∞ is the standard order on the cpo; and the order 4 on 0 is given by
Thus the local structure of the models D and D REC is the Á-theory H * ; the maximal consistent sensible theory.
Proof. Equivalence 1 is a trivial consequence of the Exact Correspondence Theorem, which shows that <s= and NT(s) are essentially the same thing modulo naming of bound variables. Equivalence 2 was proved by Nakajima in [16; 3:5] .
Equivalence 3 is Hyland's local structure theorem for D ∞ and a proof can be found in, for example, [3, Section 19:2] . The fact that the local structure is the Á-theory H * follows immediately from this. For a discussion of the properties of H * , see [3, Section 16:2].
EAC strategies and a universal model of H *
The reason that D and D REC failed to be universal, or even weakly extensional, is the existence of strategies like ⊥ deÿned in the proof of Theorem 48. This strategy has the same applicative behaviour as ⊥, and is not the denotation of any term. If we could throw out strategies which o end in this manner we would hope to improve the model.
Using a characterisation of B ohm-like trees which are the B ohm trees of some term, we can restrict our attention to the e ectively almost-everywhere copycat strategies, and show that they live in a cartesian closed category which gives rise to a -algebra D EAC . This does turn out to be universal. We then use the universality property to show that the model is also order-extensional (a stronger property than extensionality).
E ectively almost-everywhere copycat strategies
Now that we have another way to see what the denotations of terms are, we can translate standard results about deÿnable B ohm-like trees into information about the deÿnable strategies. These will be the e ectively almost-everywhere copycat strategies, and in this section we deÿne them and construct a cartesian closed category A EAC using them.
We ÿrst have to introduce some notation to refer to subtrees of an arena.
Deÿnition 58. For tree-like A ⊆ N * , i.e. those subsets which are preÿx-closed and satisfys · n ∈ A ⇒s · m ∈ A for all m¡n, we make the following deÿnitions:
Thus A@s is the subtree of A rooted ats (as deÿned it will still be a tree-like subset of N * ), and A ¿m has had the ÿrst m branches of A deleted.
We also need a way to decode the economical form of innocent functions, at least to see where in the arena a decoded strategy is playing.
Deÿnition 59. If f is the economical form of an innocent strategy on a single-tree arena A andṽ = v 1 ; : : : ; v n ∈ dom(f) then we deÿne a sequence of moves m 1 ; : : : ; m 2n+2 as follows:
By m 2(k−p)−1 · i we mean the move corresponding to that sequence in the sequencesubset representation of A, i.e. the ith child of the move m 2(k−p)−1 .
We say that the mapping f :ṽ → (i; p) codes the P-move m 2n+2 , because by following the P-strategy dictated by the function this is the move that will be the one speciÿed by that mapping. We denote the move m 2n+2 constructed fromṽ and f in this manner by m f p (ṽ). We omit the superscript wherever it is clear which strategy is intended. Similarly the fact thatṽ ∈ dom(f) means that the O-move m 2n+1 is in the strategy, and for this move we write m f o (ṽ). Note that for any innocent strategy the O-move m o ( ) is the initial move and m p ( ) is the ÿrst P-move made by the strategy in response.
Now we can make the key deÿnitions:
Deÿnition 60. Consider an innocent strategy in economical form f : N * → N × N 0 , over some single-tree arena A.
We say that f is everywhere copycat (EC) atṽ ∈ N * if f is undeÿned atṽ or the following hold: (1) The arenas A@m o (ṽ ) and A@m p (ṽ ) are order-isomorphic (with respect to the preÿx ordering, considered as subsets of N * ); (2) Wheneverw¿ṽ we have that for all i ∈ N such that the move m o (w · i) exists, f(w · i) = (i; 1); (3) If f(ṽ ) = (i; p) then p¿0.
We take the opportunity to illustrate an everywhere copycat strategy. Let us assume that f is an innocent strategy in economical form on an arena A, and suppose f is deÿned atṽ.
Intuitively, we say that f is everywhere copycat atṽ if, from m p (ṽ) onwards, f's behaviour is simply to play copycat for as long as the arena will allow it. In the ÿgure, the big triangle represents the arena A; the smaller triangle on the left represents the subarena A@m o (ṽ) and that on the right represents A@m p (ṽ) -note that by condition (i) the two are assumed to be isomorphic. Suppose O's response at m p (ṽ) is to play its ith child, then P responds with the ith child of m o (ṽ). If O at that point plays the jth child of P's last move, then P moves over to the other subarena and responds with the jth child of O's last move in that subarena, and so on. In the ÿgure, the strategy f's action is indicated by the arrows i.e. P's response is always to ip to the other subarena and copy O's last move there. Condition (i) in the deÿnition guarantees that P's copycat move will always be available.
We may view the deÿnition in light of the correspondence between innocent strategies and Nakajima trees, owing to the Exact Correspondence Theorem, and here we see that condition (ii) speciÿes that the subtree of the Nakajima tree corresponding to f, rooted atṽ, has the following shape:
Condition (iii) of the deÿnition is a technicality, which ensures that the variable y is not one of the x i .
Deÿnition 61. We say that f is almost-everywhere copycat (AC) atṽ if f is undeÿned atṽ or there exist numbers tṽ ∈ N 0 and oṽ ∈ Z with oṽ6tṽ called the copycat threshold and o set, respectively, such that (Note that f is EC atṽ if and only if f is AC atṽ with tṽ = oṽ = 0.) Finally, we say that f is e ectively almost-everywhere copycat (EAC) if f is recursive, almost-everywhere copycat at every sequence on which it is deÿned, and the functionsṽ → tṽ andṽ → oṽ are recursive. A strategy over a single-tree arena A is EAC if its innocent function is EAC, and a strategy over a multiple-tree arena is EAC if all of its components are EAC. Suppose P plays a strategy which is almost-everywhere copycat at m o (ṽ ). The two arenas A@m o (ṽ ) and A@m p (ṽ ) are shown below.
The idea is that except for ÿnitely many subtrees of the moves in question, P's behaviour is "everywhere copycat" at m o (ṽ ) i.e. P simply copies O's move between two isomorphic subarenas (which are shaded in the ÿgure).
Since the notion of EAC is only deÿned for innocent strategies, we will sometimes just say "EAC strategy" instead of "EAC innocent strategy".
For a speciÿc P-viewṽ of such a function f, we will say that tṽ and oṽ are valid copycat threshold and o set if f satisÿes conditions (i) -(iv) of AC at that P-view with those particular values. Valid copycat thresholds are not unique, as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 62. If f : N * → N × N 0 is an innocent strategy in economical form; and f is deÿned and AC at some P-viewṽ with copycat threshold and o set tṽ and oṽ respectively; then for any t ¿tṽ; f is also AC at the P-viewṽ with threshold and o set t and oṽ respectively. That is; any value larger than a valid copycat threshold is still a valid threshold for a speciÿc P-view (with the same o set).
Thus at each P-view of an EAC strategy there will be a least copycat threshold, the least value for tṽ which is still a valid threshold. However, the existence of a computable function giving valid thresholds does not imply the computability of the function giving least thresholds.
The following proof is important for what follows, and also serves as an illustration of the deÿnition of EAC strategies. Thus this strategy is AC at with t = 0 and o = − n, and in fact is EC everywhere else. Everything in sight is computable and so the strategy is EAC.
The result that identity strategies are EAC follows from their deÿnition as tupled projection strategies.
It remains to show the following:
Lemma 64. If is an EAC strategy on A ⇒ B and is an EAC strategy on B ⇒ C then the composite strategy ; is an EAC strategy on A ⇒ C.
Proof. We compose EAC strategies in the standard way (i.e. by "parallel composition plus hiding"). The composite strategy is innocent and recursive by Lemmas 26 and 33. It remains to give an algorithm that returns a threshold and an o set, which satisfy the four conditions of almost-everywhere copycat strategies, at every sequence where the composite strategy is deÿned. The algorithm and the proof, which take some six pages when written out in full, are very technical, and some care is needed in the case analysis. As this paper has a sequel [13] (see [12] for an extended abstract) in which we develop the idea of almost-everywhere copycat strategies in more depth, to obtain a universal model for the B ohm tree -theory, it seems to us more sensible to present the material there as part of a systematic account. A full version of the proof can also be found in the ÿrst author's thesis [11] .
Deÿnition 65. The category of arenas and EAC strategies, A EAC , has r.e. arenas as objects and EAC strategies on A ⇒ B as morphisms from A to B.
Theorem 66. A EAC is a cartesian closed category; in fact a lluf subcategory 2 of A REC with the same cartesian closed structure.
Proof. Certainly A EAC has the same objects as A REC , and Lemma 63 shows that the same identity strategies are morphisms of A EAC . Lemma 64 completes the proof that it is a category.
Lemma 63 also gives that the projections for A REC are also in A EAC , and recall that the evaluation morphism is just given by the identity strategy, so cartesian closure of A EAC follows from that of A REC .
The model D EAC
The arena U is an object of A EAC , as are the morphisms Fun and Gr (since they are speciÿed by the identity strategy on U ). Thus A EAC has the same re exive object as A. This allows us to deÿne a new -algebra as follows:
Deÿnition 67. We write D EAC for the -algebra M(A EAC ; U; Fun; Gr).
Since the structure of A EAC is the same as that of A REC , we know that the elements of the model are a subset of those of D REC , and the function < − = − of D EAC is the same as that of D REC . Hence, Theorem 68. D EAC is a Á-algebra with local structure equal to the -theory H * (and local order structure as described for D in Corollary 57).
The aim was that the EAC strategies should be those that correspond to terms of the -calculus. We know that every element of the model D which is the denotation of some term must be EAC, by the above comments. We now show that the converse holds.
Lemma 69. Given an EAC innocent strategy on the arena U with economical form f there is some closed term s of the -calculus such that (as a labelling function
Proof. Suppose that the copycat threshold and o set of f at the P-view coded byṽ are tṽ and oṽ, respectively.
Let the set X ⊆ N * be deÿned inductively by
Then X has the following properties:
(1) Ifṽ =ũ ·i withũ ∈ X andṽ = ∈ X then i¿tũ, so f(ṽ) = (i − oũ; 1) (by clause (ii) of the deÿnition of AC). (2) Ifṽ =ũ ·i withũ = ∈ X then f(ṽ) = (i; 1) (since f must be EC atũ, so by clause (ii) of the deÿnition of EC). We deÿne the labelling function of B ohm-like tree A (by what we call copycat collapse) as follows. The domain of A (i.e. the shape of the partially labelled tree A) is the set X . , where n = tṽ − oṽ. We make use of the characterisation of those B ohm-like trees which are the B ohm trees of terms, which can, for instance, be found in [3, 10.1.23] . This states that a B ohm-like tree A is the B ohm tree of some term if and only if A has only ÿnitely many free variables and the labels of A are given recursively. Now there are no free variables in the B ohm-like tree A (since in the second clause above, if f( v 1 ; : : : ; v p ) = (i; r) then r6p). Since the functionsṽ → tṽ andṽ → oṽ are recursive, and f is recursive, and our procedure for computing A(ṽ) from these is clearly recursive, A itself must be a recursive labelling function. Hence there is some term s with BT(s) = A. Now we prove that VFF (s) = f, and to examine the former we consider NT(s) and use Lemma 53. Now the relationship between the B ohm and Nakajima trees of a term can be deduced fairly easily from the deÿnition. Suppose that NT(s) has had bound variables renamed so that the ith abstracted variable at the node coded byṽ is x˜v i and that this renamed tree has labelling function B (so that the abstracted variables at each label of A match the ÿrst few at the same label of B).
Then at any node where A is unlabelled ⊥, so is NT(s). At a node of the tree labelled by A of the form for some trees A 1 ; : : : ; A m , we can deduce that the tree labelled by B has the corresponding subtree of the form for some trees B 1 ; : : : ; B m . Now, we show by case analysis onṽ that f(ṽ) = VFF (s)(ṽ). There are four cases: (1)ṽ ∈ X butṽ = ∈ dom(f). In this case A is unlabelled at the node coded byṽ, sõ v = ∈ dom(B), and so by Lemma 53ṽ = ∈ dom(VFF (s)). (2)ṽ ∈ X and f(ṽ) = (i; r). Then we know that A(ṽ) = x˜v 1 : : : x˜v n :x . Hence, by Lemma 53, VFF (s)(ṽ) = (i; r). (3)ṽ = ∈ X butṽ =ũ ·i withũ ∈ X . Then we know that f(ṽ) = (i − oũ; 1). Also we know that A(ũ) = x˜u 1 : : : x˜u n :y, and has m descendants, for some variable y and where m = tũ and n = tũ − oũ. Therefore by examining the diagrams comparing nodes of B ohm and Nakajima trees above, we see that B(ṽ) = x˜v 1 : : : • x˜u i−m+n . Hence, by Lemma 53, VFF (s)(ṽ) = (i − m + n; 1) = (i − oũ; 1). (4)ṽ = ∈ X andṽ =ũ ·i withũ = ∈ X . Then we know that f(ṽ) = (i; 1). Also we know that the node codingṽ is in one of the trees NT(y) for some variable y, so B(ṽ) = x˜v 1 : : : • x˜u i . Hence, by Lemma 53, VFF (s)(ṽ) = (i; 1). Hence in every case VFF (s)(ṽ) = f(ṽ).
Combining Lemma 69 with the Exact Correspondence Theorem gives that every member of the homset Hom AEAC (1; U ) is the denotation of some term. Hence, Theorem 70. D EAC forms a universal Á-algebra.
Extensionality of D EAC
Finally, we show that the model D EAC is extensional. In fact, we show the stronger property of order-extensionality. A direct proof can be given, by means of a "Separation Lemma" for EAC strategies, but in this work we give a much shorter proof which relies on known results of the -calculus and the universality of the model. 
Remark 72. This proof uses ideas from the standard proof of B ohm's Theorem. If we avoid this, taking the longer route to the proof, using properties of EAC strategies and a "Separation Lemma", we can in fact produce a semantic proof of B ohm's Theorem instead. Details can be found in [11] .
Further work
A B ohm tree model
We have deÿned an EAC strategy to be one such that there exists a computable function specifying copycat threshold and o set, and the strategy obeys some constraints determined by this function. We are not saying that every EAC strategy comes with such a function speciÿed.
This does make a di erence because if we are just given a strategy, even if told that it is EAC, we cannot e ectively determine any such function (and additionally it is not even semi-decidable whether a given innocent strategy is EAC). Now in order to turn an EAC strategy into a term we need to know the copycat thresholds and o sets, and di erent thresholds give rise to di erent terms (the di erence is Á-conversion).
So we might wish to deÿne an explicit EAC strategy, which is one which comes with a threshold=o set function. (We note that the o set can be e ectively and simply recovered if we know the threshold, so we could miss that out if we wished.) Although EAC strategies compose, and the proof that they do so is constructive in the sense that given threshold functions of the composed strategies we have a procedure for calculating the threshold function of the result, composition of explicit EAC strategies presents some technical problems. To make a CCC of such strategies we need to make some fundamental alterations to the structure, in particular using di erent objects. (One consequence is that there is not an object U with U = U ⇒ U , which one would hope for in the light of the comments below). The details of this construction are to presented in a sequel, [13] , of which an extended abstract appeared as [12] .
This makes a ÿner distinction between strategies, because given a threshold at a P-view of an EAC strategy it is still valid to claim any higher threshold. In terms of terms this is because for any term s <s= = < x:sx= for fresh x. So two strategies which have the same moves may be di erent because they have di erent threshold functions, corresponding to di erent Á-expansions. The CCC of explicit EAC strategies will be a -algebra which does not validate Á-conversion. It turns out that it has the same local structure as the B ohm tree model B, and we can prove a result akin to the Exact Correspondence Theorem, a correspondence between the standard variable-free form of B ohm trees and their explicit EAC denotation.
Questions which arise from this are: can we add the copycat threshold information into the moves of the game, recovering a "noneconomical" form which would not be quite so close to a term model. A fairly contrived way exists, but maybe it could be made more natural. Related to this, we note that it is more economical to remove all the copycat parts of explicit EAC strategies, since they are determined anyway by the threshold and o set. Is there a smart representation, and does it help with an e cient composition algorithm?
Finally, is there something else we can do in order to model exactly the smaller theory H (the minimal sensible theory)? More understanding of the di erence between B and H is needed.
The extensional collapse of D REC and inÿnitary -calculus
In order to obtain an extensional and universal model, we restricted the morphisms of A REC directly to the EAC strategies, which corresponds to a reformulation of the conditions for a B ohm-like tree to come from a term, after inÿnite Á-expansion and in the language of strategies. An interesting line of investigation is whether A EAC , or at least D EAC , can be reached by some algebraic construction from A REC .
A standard approach to getting an extensional game model is to take an extensional collapse, i.e. quotient by observational equivalence. If we can decide on a good deÿnition of observational equivalence for the model D (more di cult than usual because we do not have a clear input=output behaviour) it should be the case that all EAC strategies live in di erent equivalence classes. However, there will probably be equivalence classes not inhabited by any EAC strategy -the innocent strategy corresponding to the term intuitively given by x 1 x 2 x 3 : : : • x 2 x 1 x 4 x 3 x 6 x 5 x 8 x 7 : : : will be one. This term is not an unreasonable one for some type of inÿnitary lambda-calculus, which one might think of as reasoning about streams of processes (which themselves act on streams of processes) or perhaps as a nonterminating process in the language of -calculus. It looks like the EAC condition is imposing extensionality and an extra "ÿniteness" condition which is not inherent in innocent strategies. It would be interesting to ÿnd out exactly what sort of inÿnitary language is being modelled by the extensional collapse of D REC , and if possible to split the EAC condition into two distinct parts (extensionality and ÿniteness) in order to understand it better.
Nakajima introduced a brand of inÿnite terms when presenting the Á-expanded trees in [16] . This bears further investigation, although his method (each term is a sequence of terms which approximate it) is based on the D ∞ model and to some extent is looking from the wrong angle.
Inÿnitary lambda-calculi are a topic of current research interest. In [10] Kennaway et al. describe a uniform method for constructing inÿnite terms, identifying three independent ways in which terms can be inÿnite (inÿnite abstraction, inÿnite depth and inÿnite application). By describing 8 metrics on parse trees for terms and constructing the metric completions they give calculi with all possible combinations of these inÿnite phenomena. However it looks like the intuitive inÿnite calculus we are after is none of these.
Another approach is described by Berarducci [4] , but the focus is on inÿnite term rewriting and again the set of inÿnite terms seems not to be what we want.
John Longley has commented that the space of increasing sequences of B ohm trees might perhaps correspond to the recursive innocent strategies. This could be the way to approach it. The direction we would like to pursue is to identify exactly what the language we are thinking about is, possibly to ÿnd abstract categorical properties of models of it, and to check that the extensional collapse of D REC is a universal, fully abstract model. This language might have some interesting features (solvability is not equivalent to the existence of head normal forms, for example). Now we have to take a detailed look at the nature of the above application. Recall that for s; t : A → U , • = ; Fun; ; eval U;U and that as a strategy Fun does nothing. Let us restrict our attention to the case m = 1 so that t = v j s . The trees we compose look like this:
The application consists of composing the above pair with the eval strategy, which has the e ect of copying moves made in one X component to the other and hiding both, and allows moves played in the context subtrees 1; : : : ; k to be identiÿed and made visible.
Further, we know that on the left-hand tree we are playing the strategy vj which has initial move k − j + 1 and thereafter copies moves from the X ⇒Y component into the k − j + 1 context component. Now a strategy = <s = is played on the right-hand tree. The diagram above shows the ÿrst few moves of the composition. The composite strategy makes an initial move of k − j + 1 and then in response to the move (k − j + 1)1 copies across to the X component on the left, thence to the X component on the right. Thereafter any moves played in the X component of the right-hand side are copied over to the left-hand side, and then to the k − j + 1 component. These moves are visible on the left-hand side.
In summary, moves played by in X appear in the k − j + 1 component. Other moves made by , i.e. those in the ÿrst k subtrees, appear visible in the same subtree on the left-hand side.
Now the induction hypothesis is that down to depth l of the economical form, the strategy is {VFF (s )} k . By the deÿnition of vj the initial move of the composition is k − j + 1 so the root of the economical form tree is (k − j + 1; 0).
Let us consider what the ÿrst subtree of the economical form of this composition will be, down to depth l of that subtree (depth l + 1 of the whole tree):
There are two cases to consider. In the tree VFF (s ) any node at depth d labelled (i; d) will be relabelled by the ÿrst clause of the deÿnition of {−} k to (i + k; d). These will appear as moves justiÿed by the root of the tree and appearing in the X part of the tree on the right. Nodes with second component strictly less than their depth are una ected. Then the copycat strategy vj reproduces these in the k − j + 1 subtree. Hence the nodes of the economical form will be precisely those of VFF (s ), at least to depth l.
However there might be also nodes at depth d labelled (i; d + 1) in VFF (s ), but since all the free variables of s are in we can be sure that i6k. Hence these nodes are mapped by {−} k to (k − i + 1; d). As a strategy these are moves in the context subtrees, and in the composition they will appear as children of the very ÿrst move, hence justiÿed by a move two before the root of X . Hence the economical form will have corresponding label (k − i + 1; d + 1).
That completes the description of the ÿrst subtree of the economical form of the composition.
If Opponent's response to Proponent's ÿrst move is (k − j + 1)i for i¿1 then this move is copied into the Y component on the left-hand side and moves in response are copied back-and-forth between the subtree i of Y and the k − j + 1 context subtree.
is not activated, and because the left-hand side has the X component hidden, these copied moves appear in the composition to be from the k −j +1 subtree to the k +i −1 subtree.
Thus the economical form of the composition has the following ith subtree, for i¿1: The root node is labelled (k +i −1; 1) corresponding to the move shown in the diagram above, and since we play copycat thereafter all other moves are justiÿed by the one three beforehand in the P-view, hence the jth child of any node is labelled ( j; 1). That is, this subtree is the same as CC(k + i − 1).
where {VFF (s )} × is the same as VFF (s ) except that (1) However since all the free variables of s are in , we can be sure that the second case never happens. And that leaves what we have described for the economical form of the composition, down to depth l for each subtree, i.e. depth l + 1 for the whole tree.
Finally, we claim that the generalisation for any m clearly works in the same way.
